In April 2004, the IDF eliminated Hamas founder and spiritual leader Ahmad Yassin, along with the organization’s chief executive Abdel Aziz al Rantisi. During this period, Hamas also lost numerous field commanders.

Though weakened, Hamas was not destroyed. Since 2004 and by 2007, the organization had shifted its focus to internal struggle against Fatah, seemingly abandoning its vow to “swing the gates of hell open for Israel.” For a detailed analysis, refer to our paper ‘To Kill Hope? In Search of a Reliable Strategy to Fight Terrorism. Jewish Political Studies Review, 29(1/2), 27–57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26500671; Supplementary materials.

The paper’s short description.

Preliminary Conclusion:

The 2024 blow to Hezbollah is comparable to that dealt to Hamas in 2004. While short-term effects may be significant, this action alone is unlikely to create lasting deterrence. Sustainable deterrence could be achieved through a decisive defeat of Hezbollah, perceived as catastrophic by Lebanese Muslims (not only Shiites) and potential terrorist sponsors.

Minimal conditions for lasting deterrence include:

Severe Hezbollah manpower losses (well over 50%)

Hezbollah’s retreat north of the Litani River, accompanied by a mass exodus of the civilian population (terrorists’ families)

Israeli annexation of territory up to the Litani River, followed by repopulation with Jews and Christian Arabs

Territorial loss is the most evident sign of disaster (Nakba) for Arab leaders and the only guarantee against regular bombardment of Israel’s densely populated north. A similar effect was observed following Syria’s defeat and the annexation of the Golan Heights, which drastically improved security for Israeli communities south of the Golan.