

WITH A CANON ALL THEIR OWN...

IMMIGRATION: CHOOSING AN ADAPTATION STRATEGY ¹

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Abstract *Modern approaches to immigration policies in most developed countries make the problems of adaptation for new arrivals more severe. Protracted failure to adapt among immigrants (and even of their descendants) turns into recurrent problems vis-à-vis the law, and even extends into large scale incidents. With time, immigrant failure to adapt intensifies, while its localization in space extends to increasingly larger areas.*

Motivation for maintaining non-selective and non-working immigration are available in plenty for many bureaucrats and “leftist politicians”³. In conditions of immigration of this kind, many of the immigrants become recipients of state aid, turning into a manipulated electorate. In essence, we are here talking about importing manipulated electorates from countries which lack democratic traditions.

The cases of Canada and Australia demonstrates that the mechanism of selective immigration allows for an optimal combination of satisfying labor market needs with moderate costs of adaptation for the new citizens. This means that the costs are moderate for all: for the new immigrants, for their neighbors, and for society as a whole.

JEL codes: D72, D73, D78; K37

¹ The present paper forms Chapter 7 of [How the Import of Modern Western Institutions Suppresses Economic Growth: The 1990s East-West and West-East Transition](#) (the book titled *Institucionalnye ogranichenia sovremenogo ekonomicheskogo rosta* [Institutional Restrictions of Modern Economic Growth] in the original Russian and published in Moscow: “Delo” Publishing House, 2011). Work on the English translation of the book is at present in progress. See the book’s structure and short synopsis of content chapter by chapter.

² But Annexes

³ See definition in the book's Introduction <http://instecontransit.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/IntroEngl1.pdf>

Key words: Government's immigration strategy; immigrants' adaptation incentives; civic skill and human capital; private property devaluation; immigrants electoral behavior

*I found a home an' many friends, and some that I love dear;
Be jabbers! I'll stick to them like bricks and an Irish volunteer.
Then fill your glasses up, my boys, and drink a hearty cheer,
To the land of our adoption and the Irish volunteer!*

...

*We love the land of Liberty, its laws we will revere!
From an Irish Federalist volunteers' song
of the time of the US Civil War*

The State of the Problem

Contemporary approaches to immigration policy in the developed countries (the old Rule of Law democracies) are unable to prevent – in fact, at times they aggravate – the problem of long-term immigrant adaptation. Immigrants' profound dis-adaptation leads to regularly recurring problems with the law, escalating to the point of mutiny. Immigrants' activities may be limited to interfering in the internal affairs of their host country,⁴ or they may even lead to mass disturbances, as was the case in Paris in 2005.

The modern situation is the perfect opposite of the one when a choice would be consciously made by immigrants of the 19th and early 20th centuries in the US; during this period, the new residents were clearly aware of the reasons which had forced them to leave their homeland. They acknowledged the unquestionable superiority of the laws and customs of their host country, moved by genuine respect toward this land, or at the very least maintaining loyal allegiance to it.

The regime in any Rule of Law democracy is founded upon a series of important civil skills, which also make it possible for the regime to be reproduced. The skills of cooperative conduct, problem solving, and coordination of interests within the framework of the law and democratic procedure together all comprise an important component element of human capital. This skill of interacting with one's human

⁴ And as did, in fact, happen during the 1994 campaign in connection with the state referendum concerning Proposal #187 in California (an attempt to impose part of the social services costs on the citizen residents of the state).

milieu at minimal cost both to oneself personally and within the framework of “collective choice” requires more than training alone. Skills of this kind were in practice for a long time before study courses aimed at teaching them to students began to be introduced into school curricula. In order for these skills to be properly internalized, positive experience in making use of the right kind of institutions is required and in place for many generations running. Mass influx of immigrants disinclined to adapt (for instance, to assimilate) and arriving from countries where authority is based primarily on the power of brute force, washes away this foundation, which is a prerequisite for reproducing the “soft infrastructure” of Rule of Law democracy and authority of the law.

E. Sholefield (2007), a conservative, notes that immigrants bring down the welfare level of the population in the old democracies, this being the same population which had for centuries invested in the development of the infrastructure; this is what happens when immigrants take advantage of this accumulated capital, something that they are permitted to do, normally using it for free.

L. Azarnet (2010) indicates the problem of the decreasing number of educated and skilled workers (with observable low fertility rates), given mass immigration of unskilled workers with high fertility rates.

The classical liberal G. Hoppe has shown how the right of property (and defending this right from the threat of property devaluation) is opposed to immigrant freedom. He emphasizes that free trade is incompatible with free immigration, writing, *inter alia*, that:

...Permissiveness in immigration policy and, as a result, the defenselessness of the American and the Swiss populace from compulsory integration with foreigners are further intensified by the fact that the size of public property in both countries (just as in other countries with high earnings levels) is quite significant, while the amounts given out in social welfare – funded by the taxpayers – are high and continue to rise. Besides, foreigners are among the recipients, while commitment to a policy of free trade, in contrast to the loudly proclaimed announcements, is very distant from being complete or consistent. This is why both in Switzerland and in the US, as well as in most other countries with a high standard of living, public protest against policies bearing upon immigration is becoming more and more vociferous.⁵

⁵ Hoppe 1998.

We, by contrast, tend to think that the bulk of the “capital” resorted to by the immigrant is of essentially different stock. It consists of the laws and customs which have made the immigrants’ sought destination into a free and wealthy country. And it is to this capital that the immigrants pose the greatest threat by virtue of the strategy of “preserving the distinctive uniqueness” of newcomers.

Unlike Hoppe, modern classical liberals normally tend to uphold the rights of the newcomer individual, ignoring many of the institutional consequences which mass immigration has for the “local” individual. Yet they, too, express concern about the fact that some are required to pay for the “bonuses of multiculturalism,” which are then to be enjoyed by others.⁶

E. Meyers⁷ makes an attempt at a comparative analysis of trends in immigration policies in a series of developed countries. Describing the history of immigration policy in the US, he begins by noting the regularly recurring problem of the rise in anti-immigrant moods vis-à-vis groups both sizable and distinct in culture and values from the Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture (such as the Chinese during the Gold Rush period in California). At later points in time, tension of varying degrees was caused by immigration waves from Ireland, Japan, and Eastern and Southern Europe.

Prior to the introduction of quotas, attempts were regularly undertaken to introduce a literacy test, which would automatically eliminate the “undesirable groups” enumerated above.⁸ The attempt was also made to introduce a per capita or head tax.

For a long time, traditions of free immigration along with the need experienced by industry for cheap labor outweighed the growing societal tensions and the intensifying anti-immigrant feeling. Beginning in the late 1890s and up until 1917, Congress tried more than once to introduce an array of anti-immigrant measures, but these attempts would all be blocked by either the Senate or the President. It is worth checking into whether the hypothesis stands up to scrutiny as to that under President Woodrow Wilson, the struggle against anti-immigrant legislation was based on the Democratic Party’s hopes to get the immigrant votes. But in 1917, anti-immigrant feeling rose to such a pitch that Wilson’s prohibition against literacy testing was lifted. In the 1920s, after the Republican Administration’s coming to power, the policy of establishing

⁶ <http://www.cepos.dk/publikationer/analyser-notater/analysesinglealle/artikel/multikulturalisme-og-integration/>.

⁷ Meyers 2004.

⁸ With the exception of the Irish, who had a command of English.

immigration quotas unmistakably won the upper hand. The Democratic Party's professional trade unions, gaining in power, demanded that no new waves of rivals be allowed in; this made permanent the already arrived at balance of the leading political forces.

During later periods, immigration policy underwent changes depending on political circumstance, but remained unaltered at bottom.

During the years of the Cold War, immigrants escaped "from beyond the Iron Curtain" had priority. In the 1990s, a new priority was borrowed from Canada and Australia: investors bringing in capital and creating jobs.

As the professional trade unions grew weaker, the search for new allies of the idea of relying on new immigrants once again found supporters in the ranks of the Democratic Party (the head of a security super-office, Homeland Security Department Secretary G. Napolitano made the announcement that illegal immigration does not constitute a criminal violation of the law⁹).

In Great Britain, the beginning of the turn from free to restricted immigration was provoked by the mass influx of Jews fleeing from pogroms in the Russian Empire. The influx increased the Jewish population of the United Kingdom fivefold during the 20 years immediately prior to 1905. This happened as a consequence of the arrival of poor immigrants lacking skills or qualifications for work and having no knowledge of English. British trade unions took these immigrants to be a serious threat, and joined the proponents of restricting immigration.

Subsequent large waves of immigration had to do with moral and sometimes legal obligations committed to by the Kingdom vis-a-vis its allies (soldiers in Anders' Army) and part of the population of the Kingdom's former colonies. Growing immigration made the response of the law-abiding population more acute, leading to more rigid immigration legislation (during periods of Conservative rule).

Meyers also provides a detailed description of the dynamic of the immigration legislation in Germany and the Netherlands.

⁹ In an interview with CNN on April 19, 2009, Napolitano made the following statement verbatim: "...illegal crossing of the border in itself is not a crime; this is a civil matter..." See http://www.realeclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/04/19/janet_napolitano_klobuchar_ensign_state_of_the_union_96070.html. The announcer on the Heritage Foundation conservative blog referred to Part 8, Article 1325 of the USC, wherein illegal crossing of the border is defined as a crime. See <http://blog.heritage.org/2009/04/20/napolitano-illegal-immigration-not-a-crime/>.

Based on survey results, he draws the conclusion that immigration policy was impacted by a rather obvious set of economic and political factors, which gradually led to the convergence of legislative measures in this sphere in different countries.

The following factors impacting immigration are taken into consideration in all countries:

Labor-capable immigration (or the connection between the demand for a labor force and immigration);

Reunification of families; and

Refugees from conflict zones.

The author of the article sees the tendency toward liberalization, with its attendant refusal of racial, ethnic, and religious quotas or prohibitions as something irreversible. In his view, it is conditioned by the success in the 1960s struggle for civil rights and the impression left by the genocide of the Jews during WWII.

This does not quite tally with the fact – noted by the same author – that, for instance, in the US, not ethnic principles, but economic criteria and literacy were put forth as a basis for limiting immigration as far back as the 1890s.

Let us note that the article's choice of countries for comparative analysis is rather unfortunate, seeing as it does not take into account a radically different immigration legislation model, which is instead only summarily mentioned in passing. The case in point is the selective immigration model in use in Canada and Australia.

As far as Australia is concerned, the author of the study contents himself with the remark that the country has thrown its doors wide open for young, healthy, skilled immigrants, in order to withstand the threat of being inundated with immigrants from densely populated Southeastern Asia.

At the same time, the process of immigrant adaptation and state policy in this respect are not studied in any detail; also left unaddressed is the question of how rigid a choice the new residents face concerning whether or not to accept local legislative measures, tradition, culture, language, and so on.

As a consequence, local population behavior (including its electoral reactions) is left “suspended” or else is seen exclusively as a response by the “reactionary masses” to the process of progressive growth in cultural and ethnic diversity.

Meyers mentions the social factor and immigrants' claims for a share in state social spending as a bothersome datum (schools, medical services in California, Proposition 187).

The behavior of the immigrants themselves (the level of their obedience to the law, respect for the standards, customs, culture, or language of the host country) are hardly considered at all. These issues can be evaluated only tangentially, based on described state reactions:

Language requirements as one of the instruments for restricting immigration;
Reaction to coercive measures and other illegal steps taken by immigrants as a signal for introducing changes in immigration policy (only single cases of little significance are brought up: disturbances involving Kurds and illegal strikes with mass participation of foreign workers in Germany).

A. Shleifer¹⁰ has criticized D. Acemoglu¹¹ for confusing distinct notions which serve to advance economic growth: "human capital" and "institutions." But it should be noted that there is no way to draw a clear boundary between these concepts.

Let us consider the following notions: "normative institution" (e.g., morality) and "organization institutions," such as family, religious community, club, et al.

On the one hand, examples and models of conduct dictated by these institutions shape the ways and habits of civil life; on the other hand, they provide the grounding for formal institutions, that is, they determine the deeply rooted and hard-to-change set of norms (the real constitution; see the definition given in the Introduction) in society. Because the immigrants who are not willing to assimilate are detached from these models of conduct, their increase in number poses a real threat to the basal institutions in Rule of Law democracies.

The study by D. Acemoglu, which has been mentioned above, provides a description of the opposite kind of situation: an influx of immigrants who respect property rights and support them much more effectively than do the native inhabitants. An example can be taken from the Seychelles, where the core basis for the first legislative assemblies consisted of representatives of landowning taxpayer coalitions, most of them immigrants of European origin.

¹⁰ Shleifer et al. 2004.

¹¹ Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001.

Our view of the relationship between human capital (the personal factor) and institutional factors can be summed up in the following manner: in order for an institution to exist under conditions of Rule of Law democracy, a critical mass of market agents must be in evidence, which supports the institution in question and which provides the following:

Either the application of the appropriate norms in daily conduct, including by means of effective informal measures¹² taken as a penalty for even insignificant violations¹³;

Or the rapid emergence of a winning coalition in support of ratifying the appropriate legislation and its enforcement.

The key problem for host countries is, thus, not immigrants' lack of money or professional or language skills or capabilities, but the lack of desire on many of their part to work hard and to adapt. The new "social" state makes it possible for each immigrant to avoid (in the name of the ideals of multiculturalism) such a labor-intensive method of adapting once he or she is granted the right to vote. The root of the problem is in the state welcoming the newcomers, not in the immigrants themselves.

But if immigrants have no recourse to the option of "social" aid for long-term adaptation, getting used to a new environment, mastering the language and the standards of behavior, hard labor, and the like, then they and especially their children have more of a chance to master not only professional skills and language, but – and this is most important – by trial and error (the "Learning by Doing" method) to acquire the skills which will make it possible for them to subsist in civil society and in Rule of Law democratic states.

At the present time, the rise of anti-immigrant feeling both in Russia and in Europe is reflective of the inability (or the dearth of desire) on the part of a growing number of the immigrants to adapt to their new reality (Kochetkova 2005).

Immigration from underdeveloped countries ruled not by law, but by the right of might,¹⁴ into countries with market institutions and Rule of Law democracies has a

¹² For instance, by means of boycott. Armed defense of one's landed property should also be associated with this set of measures in part, if the state honors a person's right to bear arms and does not stand in the way of the use of arms in case of need in order to defend one's land, to say nothing of defending one's life and dignity.

¹³ That is, the rule or standard of conduct is maintained even at the "remotest approaches," such as by punishing children for trying without permission to take or use something which belongs to another person.

great deal in common with the post-communist transition period. Both situations require adapting to a multitude of new rules and realities; for many people, the acute problem arises of how to regain one's lost social status and the respect of those making up one's social surroundings. The must of finding new sources of income also becomes pressing. In case of immigration, change in one's place of residence and a language barrier surface in addition to these problems.

Choosing strategies of immigration and adaptation can be represented as a step-by-step game. The first step is taken by the host state (via the appropriate state institutions), by making choices from among the following strategies.

Strategies of discretionary procedure (offering political asylum¹⁵) or accidental selection (Green Card lottery); in both cases, the state refrains from providing any clear definition of the criteria which would make the procedure predictable for an applicant. In case of success, the lucky winner needs to do almost no real adapting and can instead enjoy a lifelong period of taking advantage of the prejudices of multiculturalism, continuing to receive aid or to advance upward along the rungs of state service. Since political asylum is normally offered based on ethnic or religious grounds, the strategy leads to the appearance in host countries of communities of natives of Rule of Force countries outfitted with systems of public relationships typical of their native settings. That is, "autonomous authorities" appear on the territory of Rule of Law states, or areas where the Rule of Law state laws are not in effect. The situation then deteriorates if neither the police nor the authorities interfere in the violent conflicts unfolding within the communities or quarters settled by the immigrants. The state encourages the emergence of such neighborhoods, instead of opposing their organization.

Strategies of selective, formal, and predictable procedure for immigration and subsequent assimilation (primarily of the Rule of Law variety, rather than of the cultural-daily kind). For ideological reasons, such a strategy precludes implicit delegating of state power authorization to informal and often criminal ethnic groups.

¹⁴ I.e., society of the kind to which we refer as "Rule of Force"; see the definition provided in the Introduction.

¹⁵ The arbitrariness of the decision is further assured by the fact that the official preparing and receiving the application usually has no need to be concerned about the decision's being appealed. Even a demand to disclose the reasons for the refusal, in case the request is denied, is unlikely.

Let's follow the possible ramifications when the choice is made of one of the two strategies of immigrant reception and adaptation (the socially oriented multiculturalist kind and the individual one).

The first strategy is opted for by most European countries; the intermediate (the one featuring accidental selection) is followed by the US; while the second is applied in Canada and Australia.

When the state has made its choice, the next move is up to the prospective immigrant:

Whether to choose the labor-intensive adaptation strategy, so as to realize the potential of the new homeland in making one's family flourish in the long term; Or whether to entrust some third parties with the responsibility for one's sustenance.¹⁶

This is a perfectly real option, given conditions when many states are determined not simply to redistribute by means of taxation in favor of the "new citizens" those resources which have been acquired and made secure by the economically active part of the population, but also to forbid those bearing the burden of such measures to complain. This last is accomplished by restricting freedom of speech.¹⁷ That is, by joining an ethnic community, immigrants can effectively lobby their interests through collective action (Hardin 1997) and obtain regular revenue payments at the expense of the general welfare state budget, instead of looking for work and learning the language of their new country.

Given arbitrary decision making about granting the right of residence (not to grant it, or to grant it along with a generous package of goods unearned by the immigrant), the strategy of immigrant refusal of the labor-intensive adaptation process is the only rational one. The next step is the immigrant's deciding to preserve his or her "cultural pristine self," and to hook up with those like him or her in order to obtain regular revenue payments from the budget. When thereafter an immigrant bound to the traditional community of the Rule of Force type makes the decision to resort to violence so as to exert pressure upon the host state, this seems a natural and quite rational sequel of the chosen track. As a rule, as long as one does not go too far, this

¹⁶ See the instance of Denmark: the first strategy leads to gains both for the immigrant and the new homeland; the second proves a burden for the new homeland. See <http://www.berlingske.dk/politik/vestlige-indvandrerer-bidrager-mest>.

¹⁷ Hate speech legislation provides the effective measures.

line of conduct is safe enough, permitting one at the same time to preserve some kind of high status within the community.

Opportunities for discretionary decision making and staff-inflating measures taken to accommodate “new important” goals provide a powerful stimulus for officials’ encouragement of what is a priori parasitical immigration.¹⁸

In order to adapt to the free market (capitalist) system and to Rule of Law democracy, it is requisite that one give up an enormous set of habits and stereotypes. The experience of both individual and group strategies applied in countries with transit economies demonstrates this very clearly.¹⁹

Nations better adapted to the market and to democracy were inclined to support those siding with the market – parties advocating a compact state, privatization, and low taxes and state spending. By contrast, those nations who were skeptical in their evaluation of their chances of flourishing in conditions of market and free competition, tended to support the Left, the parties advocating extensive state property, and high taxes and spending.

We may assume that immigrants, by analogy, vote for certain parties based on their expectations of success (or failure) in competition, as well as based on their chosen adaptation strategy; i. e., either pro-low taxation parties, or parties supporting the generous state. Adopting this line of interpretation of election results, electoral statistics may be used as an instrument for assessing the adaptation strategy immigrants choose.

At the same time, the way they evaluate their own competitive ability impacts the voting behavior of the native local population. Think back, for instance, to the familiar case of the support which Le Pen’s National Front (NF) in France was given by the original population precisely in those areas, where the numbers of the newcomer Arab population were particularly high. Parties such as the NF in France or J. Haider’s party in Austria are the mirror image of the classical leftist parties. The

¹⁸ As an illustration of this problem, take discussions concerning gypsy migration through EC countries. See the newsreel coverage pattern showing the expulsion of gypsy bands from France in August 2010 following the disturbances in Grenoble and along roads, dating from July of the same year:

<http://www.eutimes.net/tag/france/> ; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11020429>
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/13/france-deportation-roma-illegal-memo>.

Clearly, the 17.5 billion euro set aside by the EuroCommission for “gypsy integration” is a substantial motive for euroofficials not to facilitate real integration, but to make the problem resurface regularly instead.

¹⁹ Mau, Yanovski 2003, 2006.

only difference consists in that their demands for redistribution are formulated in a somewhat different manner (albeit not always; the NF, for example, is a direct competitor of the communists, who also lay claim to the votes cast by the uneducated Caucasian workers).

Comparing statistics obtained during elections which were conducted in immigrant densely populated areas with those from other regions in Russia, Germany, and Canada, we were able to evaluate adaptation ability and the self-evaluation of the original local population (which affects this population's ability "to accept" immigrants in their home territory).

Analyzing the behavior of the Russian electorate has shown that in many regions, voters have a pessimistic view of their own future, partly as a consequence of their low ability to adapt to market realities.²⁰ Voters of this kind voice a demand for a particular type of politician, the type defined by Glaeser as "hatred suppliers."²¹

The fact that the naturalization process requires a number of years, makes it possible to rule out the response of a novice immigrant (whether the response be one of euphoria, or one of depression caused by initial problems) and assess immigrant voting behavior as a reflection of a strategic choice, rather than a short-term reaction to thorny issues.

We will use voting behavior data in order to bring out the dominant adaptation strategies among immigrants from backward countries in developed Rule of Law democracies. These data will also permit us to obtain material for evaluating the effectiveness of immigration legislation (this legislation's possible impact on adaptation strategy choice).

Verifying the Model and Country-Specific Observations

²⁰ Kochetkova 2005.

²¹ Glaeser 2002.

Data

Two countries were chosen for purposes of comparative analysis: the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada. Both states are federations, a circumstance which made a greater number of observations possible. These countries' immigration policies are also radically different from each other.

Criminal statistics for all regions was used in the analysis, including areas densely populated by immigrants, so as to enable an assessment of the quality of immigration policy (assessing it as neutral or unfavorable selection of potential new neighbors from the point of view of residents of the areas in question).

In addition, for the provinces and territories belonging to Canada, the following were analyzed:

Groups of immigrants from the US and Europe as bearers of elements of human capital as listed above;

Immigrants from Asian and African countries which are not Rule of Law democracies²²: the absence of personal experience in using Rule of Law democratic institutions and family tradition of support and respect for such institutions raises the costs of independent adaptation;

Immigrants from countries in South and Central America: natives of this region are bearers of the intermediate level of corresponding elements of human capital (considerably higher ability to join effort within the framework of a Rule of Law democracy than among Africans);

Immigrants from countries in Eastern and Southern Europe (the level of these component elements is above average);

Voting for parties who are pro-high budgetary spending (economic platform) and "pro-multicultural" (ideological preferences) as an indicator of low-quality human capital and aiming for a strategy of dependency or welfare adaptation; and

Technical data on the administrative division of the country.

Study of the German regions included the following parameters:

The share of the total population made up by the foreigners (insofar as new immigrants normally tend to settle in the vicinity of their compatriots, we work based on the assumption that the share of foreign nationals – as to whom

²² With the exception of Israel.

statistics are available – correlates strongly and positively with the share of immigrant voters in the same area); and

Programs, declarations, and activities of the leading political parties (those represented in the Bundestag).

Only 16 observations for cross-section study have been obtained for Germany. For Canada, we have taken advantage of data from the 2000 general parliamentary elections results and the 2001 population census results. (The data are cited per share of immigrants in 13 provinces and territories, as well as in 25 metropolitan areas.) Taken into account were election results for all the 65,477 voting districts in Canada. Many of the statistical data in Canada are collected and published for each of 27 metropolitan areas. For the Kingston (Ontario) and Abbotsford (British Columbia) metropolitan agglomerates, no data on the part of the total population comprised by immigrants was available. The total findings pertaining to the share of the population made up of immigrants were made available for 25 metropolitan areas and 13 provinces and territories. The provinces in Prince Edward Island, Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut have no metropolitan agglomerations; the capital metropolitan area of Ottawa-Hull (the National Capital Region in Canada) includes areas from the provinces of both Ontario and Quebec, so that all data from the small towns and rural areas of these two most densely populated provinces have been grouped in two aggregate observation units. Taking into account the points noted above, 37 observations were singled out.

Variables

Dependent variable: voter support for extremist and leftist parties (parties ideologically geared toward fascism or communism, or else originating from the like).

The leading hypothesis consists in that the system of “social protection” undermines motivation for independent efforts made to adapt, and provokes extremist behavior among immigrants. The system of “social protection” implicitly encourages the arrival of persons who, back in their homeland, were already in a condition of social dis-adaptation. These are people with an a priori claim for a lifelong position of welfare dependency; the system appeals to them, instead of attracting the independent, the enterprising, and the hardworking. In other words, conduct aimed at

securing financial assistance is solicited, rather than behavior of a productive variety; what is elicited is a strategy of foisting standards of a backward society on the leaders (“multiculturalism”), instead of entering frontline society (political rightist or economic assimilation).

Party voting statistics were used in order to single out the leading trends – pro-redistribution coalitions (leftist extremists) and criminal statistical data.

Given statistically significant correlation between the share of immigrants and voter support enjoyed by these parties, or between the share of immigrants and the crime rate, the hypothesis becomes impossible to reject.

Germany

Calculation (see Attachment 1 to the present chapter) shows the interdependence between the share of the population made up of foreigners and the level of voter support for the Green Party in elections to the Bundestag (voting by lists). Taking into account the fact that CIS immigrants in Germany have a stable reputation as extreme conservatives, the most likely explanation of this correlation should be sought in the strong support given this party by the Turkish immigrants.

The Green Party is one of the two budgetary-expansionist parties (as well as a leftist one) and is uncontested as one of the most focused on encouraging immigration.²³

The transition from socialism to market democracy as a species of migration: The case of East Germany. Residents of post-socialist countries with transition economies have encountered many of the same problems facing immigrants; within brief spans of time, they have had to adapt to new social, economic, legal, and political systems. True enough, they were able to avoid a series of rather significant transactional expenses, which are normally a must for immigrants: no need to master a new language was involved, or to sell real estate, or to settle into a new location.

Comparative analysis of transition strategies²⁴ is testimony to “shock” strategy advantages; at the same time, failures are also evident of practically all attempts to facilitate adaptation (especially at the expense of the state budget), along with the fiascoes of multiple recipes for gradual transformation. At the time of Germany’s

²³ See the party website at <http://www.gruene.de/cms/default/rubrik/0/3.htm>.

²⁴ Mau, Yanovskiy, Javoronkov, et al. 2003.

reunification, the authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany made the strategic decision in favor of a different, “generous” scenario. This choice was probably predetermined by the aim not to let the Social Democratic opposition and professional trade unions turn the new lands into a stronghold of their own. The first elections and then the following ones seemed to confirm the correctness of the decision made: the largest number of votes in the East was cast in support of parties making up the Christian Democratic Union – Free Democratic Party ruling coalition in Germany. But then came the crash. The generous financing had radically raised Eastern Germans’ expectations, thereby directly undermining their competitive capacity on the labor market. Unemployment skyrocketed, hitting indicators unthinkable for the “old” lands. All this while for hundreds of thousands of Germans it was still clearly impossible to reap the advantages of the destruction of the “Wall.” The early years’ euphoria was replaced by profound disappointment, with considerable support being given to leftist extremists (the Democratic Socialist Party, then leftist parties) and the radical nationalists (the NDP). For a significant number of households, the attempt at social defense during transition turned into stable inability to adapt, along with nostalgia for the rigid totalitarian regime of the GDR, and the like.

Canada

The country has a tradition of attracting immigrants. At the same time, selective immigration policy (along with which a certain number of immigrants is to be observed who have submitted a request for and been granted political asylum, but their numbers are much lower than those of the principal part of the influx) makes it possible to avoid burdening the budget with enormous adaptation expenditures. Moreover, the selected immigrants adapt within a relatively short period of time. The set of requirements is quite simple: immigrants must have the education, skills, work experience, and mastery of language requisite for the labor market. Meeting these requirements allows the immigrants to become donors to the budget, rather than a burden for it.

It should be noted that neither the serious crime rate, nor the share of votes in support of anti-immigrant parties (as the reaction of the original local population), nor the particularly significant voter support for pro-high budgetary spending parties (the New Democratic Party and the Green Party) have any sizable concentration in

the urban areas of the Provinces of Ontario or Quebec, which are both densely populated by immigrants.

The more competitive and wealthy voters give their support – as often happens – to the conservative, pro-market parties advocating a compact state. The less competitive voters usually vote for leftist, pro-regulation state parties.

The statistical analysis presented in Attachment 2 to the present chapter demonstrates that neither the liberals, nor the conservatives, nor the leftists in Canada enjoy any clearly expressed voter “ethnic” support. That is, taken as a whole, the immigrants distribute their votes among the various parties in a manner roughly similar to that of native Canadian-born voters.

France (the case of the Algerian loyalists)

The ancestors of what may well be the majority of today’s Parisian marauders and hooligans were socially rather well adapted, respectable citizens. They owned property, respected the law, and served the French Republic. Their preferences and loyal allegiance were so strong and stable that they managed to preserve them even a wave of nationalist feeling swept Algiers, making a new option available. They paid an enormous price for their loyalty, becoming the primary target for the bandits of the NLF (the National Liberation Front) in Algiers. Members of this last tortured and murdered loyalists (Horn 2002; Johnson 1983).

The French leaders’ decision to capitulate in the face of the mutineers led to the killing of tens of thousands of loyalists after the French military had absconded from Algiers. Tens of thousands of others managed to make their way to France. The adaptation strategy of the authorities’ choice reduced to building separate neighborhoods so as to provide inexpensive living quarters for the new immigrants (the living arrangements being free for refugees) and bail money for betrayal, the funds totaling modest sums meted out as aid which did, nonetheless, suffice for basic survival needs. Clearly, those who, back in their homeland, had lost not only a roof over their heads, but also a familiar way of life (including earned income) and had been dealt a severe blow to their self-respect, could not accept this aid and lodgings as fair compensation for the losses they had actually suffered in reality. Naturally, their children and grandchildren, to say nothing of members of new waves of

immigrants, are even less inclined to be grateful to France or to maintain any level of loyal allegiance to this particular country.

The outcomes of this immigration policy are well known: they find their expression both in the growing tension in French state finances and in the votes cast by these citizens in support of extremists, as well as in the waves of unrest and regular incidents of mass vandalism, which have by now become routine.²⁵ Besides, an immigration policy of this kind creates a favorable environment for numerous terrorist organizations in the very heart of the “old Europe.”

Conclusions

The data available do not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the hypothesis that immigrants are motivated to cooperate by a selective mechanism for choosing the most well-qualified and loyal immigrants from countries where authority is based on coercion, along with state institutional focus on immigrant adaptation based on assimilation (at least from the political-legal point of view). But where there is no powerful and ramified social protection system, such a strategy of immigrant absorption provides immigrants with strong motivating factors for improving their level of language mastery and their knowledge of the laws, customs, and traditions of the host country, as well as to enhance their work qualifications, to work hard for long hours, to pay taxes, and so on. That is, to turn into responsible citizens, taxpayers, and voters enjoying full civil rights.

It is also impossible to reject (see the example of Germany) the hypothesis about the existence of interest groups and political coalitions aiming to create a voter reservoir using non-adapted immigrants (by encouraging a hostile country to engage in propaganda financed by countries supporting international terrorism). Disadaptation makes such people into reliable allies of radical leftist groups; they become dependent on both the politicians and bureaucrats and the community leaders often fed by outside funding. In other words, given non-selective immigration, a considerable part of the immigrants becomes clients of state aid and a body of voters subject to manipulation. In essence, what we are then facing is the importation of a

²⁵ http://timescorrespondents.typepad.com/charles_bremner/2007/11/behind-the-new.html.

body of voters which can easily be manipulated from countries having no democratic tradition.

A vicious circle emerges. The attempts made by the aforementioned groups and coalitions to preserve sizable state budget commitments intact raise the interest in choosing an ineffective immigration model. The model provides the conditions for an increased influx of immigrants with low-level human capital. It is impossible to find effective solutions to the problem of maintaining law and order as well as motivation for legal economic activity, while at the same time also encouraging an influx of people little suited for adaptation, whose primary urge for effective independent adaptation is being stifled, to boot.

These kinds of motivation and tendencies lead to distorted “soft infrastructure” of the formal institutions buttressing a market economy.

It is recommended that the authorities in countries welcoming immigrants design their policies in this area based on the Canadian model. In Canada, partly as a result of policies of the kind studied, immigrants’ interests rapidly become nearly indistinguishable from the interests of the local inhabitants. This can be seen in the statistical data for voting (comparing immigrants’ voting patterns with those of the citizens²⁶). Not least important here is the connection between this and the de facto policy of a property voting requirement, a key element in which is that citizenship is granted only after an immigrant acquires real estate in Canada. That is, an immigrant in Canada is one who not only initially is capable of earning some pittance, but who is also a person having something to lose.

But if local citizens are perceived as second-class individuals who are required to supply bearers of a different religion and culture with cash and close their eyes to their “pranks,” the situation turns precisely into what is now more and more frequently to be observed in the large cities of Western Europe. Due to the inundation by such immigrants “proud” of their culture and religion, the quality of the public good of “legal order” is impinged upon. That is, the quality of this good as delivered to taxpayer citizens goes down, while its delivery costs rise. At the same time, insofar as the quality of ill-adapted immigrants even as workers is doubtful, they contribute to the labor market considerably less than is generally supposed; but they increase the social commitments of the state, thus imposing a burden on the

²⁶ This holds even though a sizable number of the new citizens are quite active economically, being themselves interested in lower taxes and lower regulation levels.

working local population. This last is then motivated to sell its homes, whose value has dropped, and to move into neighborhoods less saturated with immigrants, or even to emigrate, moving to other countries. These negative tendencies superimpose on the low birth rate, which is in turn bound up with the crisis of the family (see Chapter 12). All this leads to a crash of the state redistribution systems and to enormous tension in private retirement savings systems.

The accumulating problems in connection with maintaining legal order, tension on the labor market, and population aging threaten economic growth in most urbanized industrial countries, including both the old democracies and the post-socialist countries with transition economies.

Immigrants' aid money-focused conduct further strains the budget. Stronger radical anti-capitalistic parties make the investment climate deteriorate. This is why the presence of immigrants who ignore language study and other venues of adapting socially in their new locale does nothing to mitigate the problem of population aging in their new country, except for a very short period of time (not longer than a single generation's lifespan, beyond which there is a risk of the problem's growing more acute). Moreover, they create additional problems and risks for their host countries.

Carrying on these studies will become a possibility if the period of observation is extended, so as to obtain a data panel for each of the different immigration policy types.

English by Elen Rochlin

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Annex 1

Statistical Illustration on Federal Republic of Germany Lands (States) – electoral statistics

Regression results presented in the Table 7.1., show statistical connection between support for Green party List (2005 Federal Elections, variable *GRUNE2005_1ST_PCT*) and share of foreign-born population in respective Land (variable *FOREIGN_POPULATION_PCT*). This simple regression explains almost two-third of the electoral support variation for Green party ($R^2 = 0,69$).

Table 7.1

The Greens' Electoral results, 2005.
depending on immigrants' share (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG)

Dependent variable: GRUNE2005_1ST_PCT Observations number: 16				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob.
FOREIGN_POPULATION_PCT	0,405435	0,073305	5,530813	0,0001
C	0,010082	0,006478	1,556222	0,1420
R-squared	0,686027	Mean dependent var		0,041388
Adjusted R-squared	0,663601	S.D. dependent var		0,021733
S.E. of regression	0,012605	Akaike info criterion		— 5,792976
Sum squared resid	0,002224	Schwarz criterion		— 5,696402
Log likelihood	48,34381	F-statistic		30,58989
Durbin-Watson stat	1,747699	Prob(F-statistic)		0,000074

Electoral support for Christian Democrats (*CSU_CDU2005_1ST_PCT* and *CSU_CDU2005_2ND_PCT* variables) turned out to be non-correlated with foreign-born population share (*FOREIGN_POPULATION_PCT*) nor in 1st, nor in 2nd round (see Table 7.2, 7.3. respectively) of the 2005 Bundestag Elections .

Table 7.2

Electoral support for Christian Democrats, 2005 Elections' 1-st round depending on immigrant's share (Federal Republic of Germany)

Dependent variable: CSU_CDU2005_1ST_PCT Observations number: 16				
Variable	Coefficient t	Std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob.
FOREIGN_POPULATION_PCT	0,489794	0,407173	1,202915	0,2490
C	0,234471	0,035984	6,515949	0,0000
R-squared	0,093675	Mean dependent var		0,272291
Adjusted R-squared	0,028938	S.D. dependent var		0,071050
S.E. of regression	0,070015	Akaike info criterion		—2,363754
Sum squared resid	0,068629	Schwarz criterion		—2,267180
Log likelihood	20,91003	F-statistic		1,447005
Durbin-Watson stat	1,673566	Prob(F-statistic)		0,248958

Table 7.3

Electoral support for Christian Democrats, 2005 Elections' 2-nd round depending on immigrant's share

Dependent variable: CSU_CDU2005_2ND_PCT Observations number: 16				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t- Statistic	Prob.

			s	
FOREIGN_POPULATION_PCT	0,349473	0,354192	0,986678	0,3405
C	0,208856	0,031302	6,672319	0,0000
R-squared	0,065017	Mean dependent var		0,235841
Adjusted R-squared	—0,001768	S.D. dependent var		0,060851
S.E. of regression	0,060904	Akaike info criterion		— 2,642553
Sum squared resid	0,051931	Schwarz criterion		— 2,545980
Log likelihood	23,14043	F-statistic		0,973534
Durbin-Watson stat	1,703089	Prob(F-statistic)		0,340547

The similar statistical connections observed for 2002 Federal Elections. There are strong dependence of electoral support for Greens' (*GRUNE2002_1ST_PCT*, see Table 7.4.) depending on immigrants' population share. i.e. foreign-born compact populated areas turned of to be Leftists' parties strongholds.

Table 7.4

The Greens' Electoral results, 2002.
depending on immigrants' share (FRG)

Dependent variable: GRUNE2002_1ST_PCT Observations number: 16				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic s	Prob.
FOREIGN_POPULATION_PCT	0,417296	0,053829	7,752238	0,0000

C	0,010953	0,004757	2,302441	0,0372
R-squared	0,811059	Mean dependent var		0,043175
Adjusted R-squared	0,797563	S.D. dependent var		0,020572
S.E. of regression	0,009256	Akaike info criterion		— 6,410598
Sum squared resid	0,001199	Schwarz criterion		— 6,314025
Log likelihood	53,28479	F-statistic		60,09719
Durbin-Watson stat	1,723699	Prob(F-statistic)		0,000002

Annex 2

Statistical analysis for Canadian metropolitan areas

Neighborhoods predominantly populated by immigrants in the Canada aren't turn out to the leftist parties' electoral strongholds (see table 7.5). The composit variable *US&WestEuropmigrants* + *EastSouthEuropmigrants* + *LatAmermigrants* + *AfroAsianmigrants* shows the aggregate share of immigrants from various countries (USA, Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia).

Table 7.5

Electoral support for NDP, 2000 Elections' depending on immigrant's share (Canada)

Dependent variable: NDP electoral outcomes on aggregate share of immigrant population ; Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrant s+ + EastSouthEuropmigrant s + + LatAmermigrants + +AfroAsianmigrants	0,154594	0,160857	0,961065	0,3431
C	0,191179	0,025511	7,494105	0
R-squared	0,021675	Mean dependent var		0,208651
Adjusted R-squared	—0,00628	S.D. dependent var		0,099905
S.E. of regression	0,100218	Akaike info criterion		—1,7104
Sum squared resid	0,351528	Schwarz criterion		—1,62332
Log likelihood	33,64235	F-statistic		0,775429

So, electoral support for the leading party of "generous" spending – New Democratic Party (NDP) hasn't significant connection with immigrants' population.

The Table 7.6 presents outcomes of regression, explaining electoral support for NDP by the immigrant population from various regions of the World: USA and Western Europe (variable *US&WestEuropmigrants*), from Latin Southern and Eastern Europe (variable *EastSouthEuropmigrants*), Latin American origin immigrants (variable *LatAmermigrants*), and immigrants from Africa and Asia (*AfroAsianmigrants*).

Table 7.6

Electoral support for NDP, 2000 Elections' depending on immigrants populations' origin share (Canada)

Dependent variable: New Democratic Party's (NDP) results Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrants	1,05975	0,543885	1,948481	0,0602
EastSouthEuropmigrants	1,115793	1,213144	0,919753	0,3646
LatAmermigrants	—4,77385	2,052565	—2,3258	0,0265
AfroAsianmigrants	0,33044	0,265573	1,244255	0,2224
C	0,171159	0,029602	5,781909	0
R-squared	0,206547	Mean dependent var		0,208651
Adjusted R-squared	0,107366	S.D. dependent var		0,099905
S.E. of regression	0,09439	Akaike info criterion		—1,75768
Sum squared resid	0,285101	Schwarz criterion		—1,53999
Log likelihood	37,51715	F-statistic		2,082519

Durbin-Watson stat	2,072995	Prob(F-statistic)	0,106239
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The outcomes presented in the Table 7.6. show negative and significant connection with the Latin American immigrants.

Immigrants from USA and Western Europe a little be inclined to support NDP (*US&WestEuromigrants* positively correlates and statistically significant on 6%-level).

The next Regression (Table 7.7) immigrants from USA and Europe counted together – as aggregate variable (*US&WestEuromigrants+EastSouthEuromigrants*).

Table 7.7

Electoral support for NDP, 2000 Elections' depending on shares of immigrants of USA and European origin (Canada)

Dependent variable: Electoral support for NDP; Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob.
US&WestEuromigrants + EastSouthEuromigrants	1,082908	0,46355	2,336119	0,0257
LatAmermigrants	—4,72811	1,246432	—3,79332	0,0006
AfroAsianmigrants	0,329043	0,264165	1,245598	0,2217
C	0,170705	0,029001	5,886279	0
R-squared	0,206515	Mean dependent var		0,208651
Adjusted R-squared	0,13438	S.D. dependent var		0,099905
S.E. of regression	0,09295	Akaike info criterion		—1,8117
Sum squared resid	0,285112	Schwarz criterion		—1,63754
Log likelihood	37,51639	F-statistic		2,862897
Durbin-Watson stat	2,071229	Prob(F-statistic)		0,051573

The only significant statistical connection found is voting for NDP and USA, Western Europe origin immigrants.

We guess, that possible explanation for this connection rooted in the type of the people escaping USA. These people are strongly inclined to values of welfare (nanny) state and they were escaping from necessity to compete hard and to bear risks, personal responsibility (before Obama administration). Some of immigrants of Eastern European origin could be similarly motivated (prefer lower incomes and lower risks).

Table 7.8 The voting for marginal leftist parties' candidates

Dependent variable: aggregate electoral support for the marginal leftists (Marxists, Cannabis party, etc .)				
Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
US&WestEuromigrants	—0,07167	0,102678	—0,69798	0,4902
EastSouthEuromigrants	0,061597	0,044312	1,390076	0,1741
LatAmermigrants	—0,10138	0,097189	—1,04312	0,3047
AfroAsianmigrants	—0,01136	0,009167	—1,23942	0,2242
C	0,008977	0,006678	1,344266	0,1883
R-squared	0,021147	Mean dependent var		0,006324
Adjusted R-squared	—0,10121	S.D. dependent var		0,012816
S.E. of regression	0,013448	Akaike info criterion		—5,65482
Sum squared resid	0,005788	Schwarz criterion		—5,43713
Log likelihood	109,6141	F-statistic		0,17283
Durbin-Watson stat	1,256853	Prob(F-statistic)		0,950714

Regressions' outcomes presented in the Table. 7.8 show the marginal leftists aren't immigrants' favorites too.

Table 7.9 Electoral support for marginal leftists and the Greens'

Dependent variable: Marginal lefts + Greens' electoral support aggregate Observations' number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrants	0,318105	0,177626	1,790872	0,0828
EastSouthEuropmigrants	—0,08052	0,119613	— 0,67313	0,5057
LatAmermigrants	0,252836	0,300447	0,841533	0,4063
AfroAsianmigrants	0,023682	0,072523	0,326538	0,7461
C	0,033368	0,010299	3,239874	0,0028
R-squared	0,133072	Mean dependent var		0,047157
Adjusted R-squared	0,024706	S.D. dependent var		0,023449
S.E. of regression	0,023158	Akaike info criterion		— 4,56787
Sum squared resid	0,017161	Schwarz criterion		— 4,35018
Log likelihood	89,50563	F-statistic		1,227984
Durbin-Watson stat	1,470351	Prob(F-statistic)		0,318535

Table 7.9. Regressions show almost the same results as 7.7. Table: USA and Western European origin immigrants go a little bit more "greens" than average voters (connection is significant on 8% level).

Table 7.10

Aggregate Left (NDP included)

Dependent variable: electoral support for all leftist parties, including NDP Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrants	1,377855	0,592074	2,327167	0,0264
EastSouthEuropmigrants	1,035278	1,199157	0,863338	0,3944
LatAmermigrants	—4,52101	1,995267	—2,26587	0,0304
AfroAsianmigrants	0,354122	0,27586	1,283703	0,2085
C	0,204527	0,031396	6,514461	0
R-squared	0,246838	Mean dependent var		0,255807
Adjusted R-squared	0,152692	S.D. dependent var		0,101167
S.E. of regression	0,093124	Akaike info criterion		— 1,78469
Sum squared resid	0,277505	Schwarz criterion		—1,567
Log likelihood	38,01673	F-statistic		2,621878
Durbin-Watson stat	1,943768	Prob(F-statistic)		0,05306

Regression 7.10 supports the above mentioned finding – left leaning electoral behavior of the immigrants of USA and Western European origin and lack of trust in leftists' ideas (or lack of interest in Leftists' agenda) among the immigrants of Latin American origin in the Canada.

Table 7.11

Electoral support for the Liberal party of Canada

Dependent variable: Voting for the Liberal Party Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t—Statistic	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrants	0,157713	0,954959	0,165151	0,8699
EastSouthEuropmigrants	1,250211	0,96286	1,298434	0,2034
LatAmermigrants	—0,87922	2,151953	— 0,40857	0,6856
AfroAsianmigrants	—0,00791	0,251255	— 0,03146	0,9751
C	0,278628	0,043723	6,372564	0
R-squared	0,061127	Mean dependent var		0,308076
Adjusted R-squared	—0,05623	S.D. dependent var		0,117088
S.E. of regression	0,120335	Akaike info criterion		— 1,27199
Sum squared resid	0,463373	Schwarz criterion		—1,0543
Log likelihood	28,53187	F-statistic		0,520856
Durbin-Watson stat	1,541982	Prob(F-statistic)		0,721011

Regressions 7.11 supports the idea, the Liberals (centrist or center-left Party) not attracts special attention of the immigrants: nor positive, nor negative.

Table 7.12

Electoral Support for Bloc Quebecois (Block of Quebec)

Dependent variable: Bloc Quebecois Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrants	—2,33341	0,999409	—2,33479	0,026
EastSouthEuropmigrants	—0,90171	0,678603	—1,32877	0,1933
LatAmermigrants	4,262668	3,198967	1,332514	0,1921
AfroAsianmigrants	—0,3092	0,317787	—0,97296	0,3379
C	0,149643	0,056703	2,639064	0,0127
R-squared	0,218795	Mean dependent var		0,0634 31
Adjusted R-squared	0,121144	S.D. dependent var		0,1459 59
S.E. of regression	0,136833	Akaike info criterion		— 1,0150 2
Sum squared resid	0,599144	Schwarz criterion		— 0,7973 3
Log likelihood	23,77794	F-statistic		2,2405 88
Durbin-Watson stat	2,140611	Prob(F-statistic)		0,0866 01

7.12. Regressions show immigrants' indifferent relation to the Quebec nationalists but the Western European and US origin immigrants more or less clearly denying electoral support for the Bloc Quebecois.

Table 7.13

Electoral support for the Conservatives

Dependent variable: Conservative Party's electoral support Observations number: 37				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
US&WestEuropmigrants	0,887553	1,002011	0,885772	0,3823
EastSouthEuropmigrants	—1,24929	1,195416	—1,04507	0,3038
LatAmermigrants	0,937609	2,46398	0,380526	0,7061
AfroAsianmigrants	—0,03402	0,422429	—0,08054	0,9363
C	0,351962	0,032847	10,71519	0
R-squared	0,033727	Mean dependent var		0,362623
Adjusted R-squared	—0,08706	S.D. dependent var		0,126964
S.E. of regression	0,132375	Akaike info criterion		—1,08127
Sum squared resid	0,560742	Schwarz criterion		—0,86357
Log likelihood	25,0034	F-statistic		0,279235
Durbin-Watson stat	1,690114	Prob(F-statistic)		0,88923

The regressions' outcomes presented in the Table 7.13 failed to find evidences of support for Conservatives among the immigrants.